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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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SPECIAL ASSISTANT November 21, 1946

TO : SA-E - Mr. Eddy

FROM : OCL - Allan Evans *13.*

SUBJECT: Second JIC Meeting

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The attached report of the second meeting of the JIC intelligence exchange session shows pretty well how this institution is developing and raises serious questions. I agree with Mr. Barnard that State bears by far the larger part of the burden, and the practical result of the meetings is that service agencies obtain information from us without our gaining any return worth speaking of. Secondly, since all the other members have to do is think up questions while we have to provide the answers, the burden upon us naturally becomes very great. For the coming week, to meet all the desires of the other participants we should have to send at least three members on different subjects, and if further requests are notified to us, we should require even more.

The difficulty from our own internal point of view is that we have as yet no central point at which personnel can summarize the knowledge of the organization. We simply are not designed organizationally for this kind of work - though at a later date we would hope that an increased planning section in ICD would be able to cover most of the ground. We are wondering whether, in view of this internal difficulty, we should not argue on the basis of the very poor profits to be gained from these meetings, that they are inappropriate, and might be discontinued. An alternative, of course, would be to think up an in-going series of questions which we might put to the service agencies. This, we suspect, would have a shattering effect upon the whole institution of the joint sessions.

May we consult with you at the earliest moment to settle plans, for the next meeting is already just around the corner.

~~Attachment 1~~

~~cc: Mr. Barnard~~

~~OCL:AEVans:nhl~~

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : SA-2, Mr. William A. Eddy via
OCL, Mr. Allan Evans
FROM : ICD, J. L. Barnard

DATE: November 21, 1946

SUBJECT: *Joint JIC Intelligence Exchange Meeting*

On November 19, in Room 4259 of New War Department Building, members of State, War, Navy and Air Intelligence agencies held a second meeting under JIC auspices for informal discussion of topics of mutual interest.

The meeting opened with a statement by Capt. Lang (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations), in which he attempted to clarify the Navy's position in these sessions. The Navy, he said, did not intend to come each time with a prepared topic for presentation, but rather with questions concerning trends noticed during the week on which the Navy would like the other agencies' views. The first of these questions concerned the British moving their East Mediterranean bases to East Africa centering around Mombasa. According to Navy sources, this suggestion has now reached the Cabinet level for decision and is being pushed by high British Army circles over opposition by the British Navy.

State Department, having no British Empire or Middle East expert at the meeting declined to comment. Col. McClane, Executive Officer for Col. Ennis, Chief of IG, said that the Army was studying the feasibility of the British plan and had noted the general lack of communication facilities. Except for an East-West road in the Cameroons, and of course the water, these were exceptionally bad. Army (ID) then mentioned that the British might be planning to consolidate a defense position in East Africa because of rumored uranium deposits in that area. ID, however, doubted that there would be any real abandonment of the Mediterranean area, although the Sudan was known to be favored by the lower echelons of the British Army command.

A carry-over topic for the next meeting emerged from this discussion in that both the Army and Navy representatives were desirous of knowing State's views on the political pressures for and against establishment of an Empire defense system in this area.

The Navy's second question concerned the ability of the French CP to take over the government of France. State noted this for consideration at the next meeting. The Army had no comment.

The Navy's final question raised the issue of the validity of US information on the Russian oil position. According to the Navy, a highly placed British source had stated that the British felt very shaky in their estimates on this subject. This fact had led the Navy to wonder whether our own Russian oil studies should not be reexamined. I was able to inform Capt. Phelan of ONI that such a reexamination was in process and that the results thereof would be made available to him on completion.

Discussion on these Navy questions was necessarily limited as Navy had not informed the other two agencies in advance. It was agreed that advance notification would be given in the future.

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Mr. Nelson, Chief of the Korean Section of DRF (State), next took the floor with a review of the Korean situation which was State's carry-over topic from the previous meeting. The gist of Mr. Nelson's talk was that the Korean situation was not bright, but that Soviet domination of all Korea was not a foregone conclusion. His talk closely paralleled an article on the same subject in the "Weekly Review" of November 7. At its conclusion Col. Munson, who spoke on this topic at the previous meeting, asked Mr. Nelson his opinion of the alleged CP plan to dominate Korea. Mr. Nelson said he had heard of it, but that he doubted the Communists' chances of success. Capt. Phelan then asked what the chances were of our building a resistance in the South strong enough to withstand Russian pressure from the North. Mr. Nelson replied that, in his opinion, the chances for so doing were good, but that it was too early to say whether or not we had already done so. He added that he assumed the Navy meant pressure short of Russian military occupation. When questioned about the presence of members of the Communist 8th Route Army in North Korea, Mr. Nelson said that there were reports to that effect, but that if the Chinese were there, they would be less welcome to the Koreans than the Russians.

Miss Clare Holt, Chief of the Pacific Islands Section of DRF, then spoke on State's prearranged topic for the day which was a review of the situation in the NEI -- a subject which had been covered extensively in the New York Times of that morning. In the question period following Miss Holt's talk, Col. Booth of JIC asked whether or not in her opinion the proposed agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Netherlands Government met the Indonesian peoples' desire for self-determination. Miss Holt replied that there was no complete secession provision in the agreement and that therefore theoretically it did not. Col. Booth then asked if the agreement would be attacked by Russia as another imperialist trick. Miss Holt said that that would be difficult if the agreement were signed by as rabid a nationalist as Soekarno. The chief stumbling block to amicable relations in the NEI was the attitude of the Dutch troops many of whom were "trigger happy." The Navy then asked what she thought of morale in the Netherlands with regard to military service in the NEI. Miss Holt replied that service in the Indies was attractive to people in the Netherlands because of the comparatively higher standard of living at the present time. On the other hand, she said, the Dutch youth who fought in the underground against the Nazis might question the validity of any suppressive action they might be called upon to perform. When asked about opposition to the agreement in the Netherlands, Miss Holt said that the conservatives were against it and that a political storm was brewing, but that it would probably be ratified by a majority. The conservatives were against it, she said, for traditional reasons among which was a desire to protect their investments. When asked if the Indonesian Republic was desirous of encouraging independent foreign economic relations, Miss Holt said definitely yes and that future intelligence planning should envision a study on the pros and cons of this issue.

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The Intelligence Division's topic for discussion was the situation on the northern Greek border. Col. McDowell of ID said that he felt the Soviets wanted Greece and that he would like to have the other agencies' views on the strength of the pro-communist forces in the north of Greece. ICD had been informed that the Army would speak on Greece, but had been unable to obtain a Greek expert from DRE. This subject, therefore, also was noted as a carry-over for next week. Capt. Lang's view on the Greek situation was that he felt the reports were exaggerated. Col. McDowell did not think they were.

To summarize the carry-over topics for State coverage at the next meeting, these are (1) The ability of the French CP to take over the Government; (2) the political pressures for and against establishment of an Empire Defense system in East Africa; and (3) the extent of pro-Communist forces in Northern Greece.

If, in addition, the Army and Navy inform State in advance of several other questions that occur to them during the week, and if we produce another "hot" topic, the council chamber will be overflowing. On the other hand, it can be seen from the foregoing questions that they cover a wide variety of areas and, to do them justice in answering requires considerable expertise in each field. These meetings, of course, are still in the preliminary stage and the chances are that the number of questions will diminish when these initial topics of obviously continuing interest have been treated. The gain to State of these meetings is small, coming as it does largely thru what can be picked up of the other agencies' frames of mind in discussion. State, however, must be of considerable service to them since the questions to date have been almost exclusively political, and State's role has been virtually that of the final court of appeal.

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